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Social and political philosophy has inherited a great deal from the work 
of John Rawls. He has been widely credited with reviving social theory 
in the 20th century. Amongst his many contributions is an intuitively 
simple concept which has sparked controversy and debate in the post-
Rawlsian literature on theories of justice: that of Ideal !eory, as opposed 
to non-Ideal !eory. What seems like a simple distinction has become the 
subject of debate for two important reasons: "rstly, Rawls is not particu-
larly concerned with the distinction and leaves it ill-de"ned. To illustrate: 
in his work A !eory of Justice the words ‘ideal’ and ‘theory’ appear in 
conjunction a mere "ve times. Yet, the Ideal / non-Ideal distinction strikes 
at the heart of social theory. If we take the basic goal of social theory to be 
advancing the betterment of society, many scholars agree that some ideal 
conception of society is of value to this end (see Bloch, 1986; Davis, 1981; 
Levitas, 2011). Secondly, even if Rawls had provided a clear de"nition 
of the distinction between Ideal and non-Ideal !eory, controversy sur-
rounding the object of the distinction would remain.
 Rawls de"ned his own work as Ideal !eory. Consequently, the lit-
erature on social and political philosophy has seen several attempts to 
categorize theories of justice based on the Ideal/non-Ideal distinction 
(e.g. Stemplowska, 2008); an obvious problem with this endeavour being 
that there is no consensus on what the de"nition of this distinction may 
be. !erefore, many of these e#orts have only succeeded in highlighting 
certain di$culties surrounding the debate. !is goes to show that both 
the concept of Ideal !eory and therewith the supposedly ‘ideal theories’ 
themselves are the source of much disagreement. !us, we must examine 
the nature of Ideal !eory, its contours and de"ning characteristics, before 
we can constructively discuss the consequences of this distinction on the 
theories in question.
 I wish to start by suggesting that all engagement in ideal theorizing 
has at its source some conception of an ideal society. Outside the post-
Rawlsian literature on theories of justice this concept has often been 
referred to as Utopia. However, in the literature on Rawlsian Ideal !eory 
there is a marked absence of utopian terminology. One of the reasons for 
this absence may be that scholars are wary of using the term because it is 
itself the subject of much controversy. Another reason may be that the 
term is traditionally used to refer to more than issues of justice alone. 
However, although these are defensible grounds for introducing new ter-
minology, unique to theories of justice, ignoring utopian literature results 
in a number of missed opportunities. Firstly, there is undoubtedly signi"-
cant overlap between Utopian !eory and Ideal !eory. Ideal theories of 
social justice can potentially be categorized as a subset of Utopian !eory, 
alongside for example Utopian- Moral, Political and Legal !eory. Sec-
ondly, owing to this overlap, examining the literature on Utopian !eory 
may reveal signi"cant parallels between the two debates. !irdly, and most 
importantly, integrating the concept of utopia into the de"nition of Ideal 
!eory could serve to clarify the concept. !is will, in turn, lead to a more 
fruitful use of the distinction. 
 In light of this observation the aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, to 
suggest a new way of understanding Ideal !eory, speci"cally with refer-
ence to utopian literature, in order to illustrate the bene"t of introducing 
the concept Utopia to the existing literature on Ideal !eory. To this end I 
will re-examine the Rawlsian de"nition of Ideal !eory and brie%y sketch 
the similarities between Ideal !eory and Utopia. I aim to show that Ideal 
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!eories of Justice should be regarded as Utopian. Secondly, I will look 
at two articles that discuss the relevance of Ideal !eory to see if my pro-
posed amendments aid the defence of Ideal !eory against criticism, as I 
consider Ideal !eory and Utopia to be essential to social theory.1 
Part I
In order to compare utopianism with Rawlsian Ideal !eory, a brief intro-
duction to Utopia is required. In 1516 Sir !omas More gave the name 
Utopia to his proposed ideal society. At that time the word was a neolo-
gism, or more accurately a lexical neologism, meaning that it named a new 
concept or synthesized pre-existing ones (Vieira, 2010: 3). It combined the 
Greek words ou (R੝), meaning no, and topos (ĲȩʌȠȢ), meaning place, add-
ing the su$ce ‘ia’ indicating a place. More originally intended to use the 
word Nusquama, nusquam being Latin for ‘nowhere’ or ‘never’. However, 
he chose Utopia, for when spoken in English both Outopia and Eutopia 
are phonetically alike, the latter meaning good place. !is eloquently cap-
tured the ambiguity of any such imagined society, the unceasing tension 
between the ideal and the unreachable.
 Utopian !eory is essentially concerned with conceptualizing the ‘ideal 
commonwealth’, which inherently expresses a ‘psychological aspiration of 
hope for a better state of existence in this life or elsewhere, notably in the 
form of the quest for “community”’ (Claeys, 2010: xi). Often this ‘theo-
rising’ has taken the form of literature, as in !omas More’s Utopia. But 
Utopian !eory encompasses much more than enticing storytelling alone. 
Karl Mannheim famously wrote on the relationship between Utopia and 
ideology (Mannheim, 1954), Bloch on Utopia and hope (Bloch, 1985), 
Goodwin on Utopia and politics (Goodwin, 2009), and so on. Utopian 
!eory encompasses many aspects of social theory, because Utopia is so 
fundamental to our thinking about society. With this in mind, we turn to 
the examination of Rawlsian Ideal !eory.
Rawlsian Ideal !eory and Utopia
!ere are many interpretations of Ideal !eory. For example, some scholars 
(erroneously) equate Ideal !eory solely with the condition of full-com-
pliance (to the conditions prescribed for society), one problem with this 
equation being that full compliance ‘may also hold for principles of jus-
tice which do not lead to a just society’ (Robeyns, 2008: 3). Moreover, 
nowhere does Rawls say that it is a su$cient condition for Ideal !eory. 
However, this does beg the question: what conditions are necessary for an 
Ideal !eory according to Rawls? In order to answer this we must high-
light a few key passages regarding Ideal !eory from A !eory of Justice.
 To start, Rawls limits the scope of his inquiries in several respects. For 
instance, he is concerned only with instances of justice, for ‘justice is the 
"rst virtue of social institutions’ (Rawls, 1999: 3). A further limitation 
is best summarized by the following: ‘I shall be satis"ed if it is possible 
to formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure of 
society conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other 
societies’ (Rawls, 1999: 7). Here Rawls emphasises the need for theoretical 
simpli"cation by stating that his ideal society is both closed and isolated. 
Rawls also writes: ‘[...] I consider primarily what I call strict compliance as 
opposed to partial compliance theory’ (Rawls, 1999: 7). Crucially, he goes 
on to say that partial compliance theory ‘studies the principles that govern 
how we deal with injustice’ (Rawls, 1999: 7), meaning that when there 
is full-compliance to the hypothesized principles of the theory of justice 
there can be no instances of injustice.
 So far we know that Ideal !eory is concerned with providing a theory 
of justice for an isolated society, whose members act in full compliance 
to the proposed principles of justice, resulting in a situation where there 
are no instances of injustice. !is leaves a very narrow de"nition of Ideal 
!eory, as any theory concerning partial compliance or indeed one that 
results in any instances of injustice (resulting from proposed institutional 
policy) would not be considered an Ideal !eory. Rawls goes on to defend 
this view by stating: ‘!e reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it 
provides, I believe, the only basis for the systematic grasp of these more 
pressing problems. […] At least, I shall assume that a deeper understanding 
can be gained in no other way, and that the nature and aims of a perfectly 
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just society is the fundamental part of the theory of justice’ (Rawls, 1999: 
8). Hence, Rawls claims that there can be no complete non-Ideal !eory 
without Ideal !eory.
 Rawls comes closest to a de"nition of Ideal !eory in the following 
passage:
‘!e intuitive idea is to split the theory of justice into two parts. !e 
"rst or ideal part assumes strict compliance and works out the principles 
that characterize a well-ordered society under favorable circumstances. 
It develops the conception of a perfectly just basic structure and the 
corresponding duties and obligations of persons under the "xed 
constraints of human life’ (Rawls, 1999: 216).
Here, Rawls points out that the endeavour of designing an Ideal !eory 
requires certain theoretical limitations. One of which is that it requires 
the paradoxical assumption of favourable circumstances whilst accepting 
the "xed constraints of human life; (paradoxical because the constraints of 
human life are often unfavourable to creating an ideal society). 
 At this point it must be noted that many of these same conditions 
and limitations also hold for conceptions of Utopia. Utopian !eory often 
envisions an isolated society, under favourable conditions, where there 
can be no injustice if its members comply to the societal ideals. !is goes 
to show that the de"nition of Rawlsian Ideal !eory arguably holds as a 
viable, although simpli"ed, de"nition of Utopia. We can then de"ne Ideal 
!eory to be: a system of principles that, when fully-complied to by all mem-
bers of society, results in a Utopia of social justice.
Ideal !eory and Utopianism
Against this backdrop, a number of signi"cant similarities between 
Utopian !eory and Ideal !eory become apparent. For instance, both 
Utopian !eory and Ideal !eory envision some signi"cantly improved 
version of society. Furthermore, neither theory is primarily concerned with 
explicating the transition to this ideal from our world.
 But there are other, more subtle parallels, for example: both theories 
attach some speci"c value to their imagined place. In Eutopia this is the 
good, in Ecotopia, Vegatopia and Technotopia their overriding values are 
clear. In this vein, Rawslian Ideal !eory is primarily concerned with jus-
tice. Additionally, they share the same potential to guide human progress 
by presenting a well-argued example. Conversely, both Utopian !eory 
and Ideal !eory are subject to many of the same criticisms: their ideas 
are said to be unreachable fantasies and to pursue them is a waste of time. 
Furthermore, it is no coincidence that Sir !omas More chose to situ-
ate Utopia on an island, extremely well-guarded from the outside world 
(More, 2007: 33), whilst John Rawls strives to formulate ‘a reasonable 
conception of justice for the basic structure of society conceived for the 
time being as a closed system isolated from other societies’ (Rawls, 1999: 
7).2 
 Both the work of John Rawls and many Utopian scholars share the 
belief that the social transition toward some ideal requires a conception of 
that ideal. But, the work of John Rawls di#ers from the Utopian theory 
of Mannheim, Bloch and Goodwin in that it does not explicitly discuss 
the relationship of its object (in Rawls: social justice) to Utopia. However, 
if the concept of Utopia can be integrated into Ideal !eory it becomes 
much more comparable to the works mentioned above as utopian. With 
this, the compatibility of the di#erent works on ideal societies can be 
examined, opening up the possibility of a wider, cross-discipline (or cross-
object) account of the theory of ideal societies. !us, as we have seen these 
scholars profess the importance of the concept Utopia to their respective 
theories, we can suggest that Utopia could be of similar importance for 
(ideal) theories of justice. At the very least it may serve to highlight the 
parallels that are currently overlooked by ignoring Utopia. 
 Now we can summarize the initial bene"ts of viewing Ideal !eory as 
a Utopian !eory. Firstly, the inclusion of the concept of Utopia serves to 
remind us that Ideal !eory should not be limited to theories of justice 
alone. Utopia’s most often advocate some speci"c virtue(s), hence; there 
can also be Ideal !eories of Morality, Happiness, Freedom, etc.3 Con-
sequently, we should refer to Rawlsian Ideal !eory as an Ideal !eory 
of Justice. !is frees the term Ideal !eory up to be used with reference 
to other disciplines. Secondly, the incorporation of Utopia emphasises 
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that the Rawlsian de"nition of Ideal !eory is a narrow one; Ideal !eory 
should do more than achieve a reasonably good society, relatively free from 
injustice. !e preceding two reasons demonstrate the most important 
bene"t of introducing Utopia to Ideal !eory: it serves as conceptual clari-
"cation. Furthermore, referring to a Utopia as the product of Ideal !eory, 
and thus of Ideal !eories of Justice, underlines the fact that in Rawlsian 
Ideal !eory: (1) some favourable conditions are assumed (this is arguably 
true of all Utopia’s), (2) full-compliance is a condition and (3) that there 
can be no instances of societal injustice. !is then makes Ideal !eories of 
Justice utopian. Additionally, Rawlsian Ideal !eory can bene"t from the 
warning of history often associated with Utopia in our post-communist 
world.
 !us far I have re-examined Rawlsian Ideal !eory, sketched its paral-
lels with Utopian !eory and concluded that the use of Utopia bene"ts its 
conceptual clarity. Now we proceed to the second aim of this paper, which 
is to examine the consequences of this new point of view on two articles 
from contemporary literature regarding Rawlsian Ideal !eory. !e "rst 
article defends Ideal !eory, whilst the second stands in opposition.
Part II
Zo"a Stemplowska: What’s Ideal About Ideal !eory?
Zo"a Stemplowska opens her paper by remarking that Ideal !eories ‘share 
a common characteristic: much of what they say o#ers no immediate or 
workable solution to any of the problems our societies face’ (Stemplowska, 
2008: 319). She does not, however, consider this a fatal %aw and sets out 
to defend these theories by contending that the debate regarding Ideal 
and non-Ideal theories can be productive, if they are not treated as rival 
approaches to political theory. To this end she o#ers her own de"nition of 
Ideal !eory by examining the structure of normative theory. Initially she 
writes:
‘One crucial di#erence between various normative theories concerns 
whether they o#er viable recommendations, where by viable 
recommendations I mean recommendations that are both achievable 
and desirable’ (Stemplowska, 2008: 324).
Stemplowska calls these ‘AD-recommendations’ and believes that it is the 
absence of these recommendations that is crucial in separating Ideal from 
non-Ideal !eories. Consequently, Stemplowska de"nes non-ideal theory 
as ‘theory that issues AD-recommendations, and ideal theory as theory 
that does not’ (Stemplowska, 2008: 324). With this de"nition she goes 
on to say that normative theories may lack these AD-recommendations 
for di#erent reasons. Firstly, they may o#er recommendations that cannot 
be considered AD-recommendations, and secondly they may not aim at 
o#ering any such recommendations at all. She claims that the latter serve 
only to clarify our understanding of certain values and principles, and 
can therefore not be objectionable. Of the former, she proceeds to iden-
tify several further sub-categories. Ignoring what she calls ‘bad theories’, 
Stemplowska identi"es ‘(a) theories that fail to issue AD-recommenda-
tions because they ignore the fact of non-marginal noncompliance, and 
(b) theories that fail to issue AD-recommendations because, even with full 
compliance, there is no solution to the problem for which recommenda-
tions are sought’ (Stemplowska, 2008: 331).
 In what follows, Stemplowska defends theories that do not o#er AD-
recommendations, concluding that they are nevertheless indispensable to 
normative theory. Furthermore, she claims that accepting her de"nition of 
the distinction between Ideal and non-Ideal !eory allows us to see that 
complex normative theories are likely to contain both Ideal and non-Ideal 
aspects. 
 Although Stemplowska defends Ideal !eory, her contention that the 
identi"cation of AD-recommendations best resolves what is at stake in 
the debate between Ideal and non-Ideal !eories fails to be convincing. 
!e main problem with her approach is that she o#ers a negative de"ni-
tion of Ideal !eory, meaning she de"nes Ideal !eory by what it is not. 
She identi"es a characteristic that is most often associated with non-Ideal 
!eory and then attempts to de"ne and categorize Ideal !eories by virtue 
Volker Ruitinga | Ideal !eory and Utopia
52
Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy
of the absence of this characteristic. !is results in the need to categorise 
di#erent Ideal !eories according to why they do not meet the criterion of 
supplying AD-recommendations. With each of these additional categories 
come further issues of de"nition. !e obvious problem with this approach 
is that it is unclear how these divisions are to be made.
 Furthermore, Stemplowska approaches the de"nition of the distinc-
tion between Ideal and non-Ideal !eory from the bottom-up. Meaning, 
she takes a characteristic of the majority and de"nes the minority by its 
absence. Consequently, her de"nition of non-Ideal !eory is too broad. 
Undoubtedly there is a much greater body of non-Ideal !eory, but using 
a common feature of the majority as the basis for a negative de"nition 
of the minority may lead to several undesirable consequences: (1) Ideal 
!eories may falsely be labelled non-Ideal; some of Rawls’ recommenda-
tions are arguably both achievable and desirable, for example, and (2) 
non-Ideal theories may be labelled ideal, as their output could be argued 
to be both unachievable and/or undesirable. It would be more fruitful to 
characterise Ideal !eories by virtue of some unique feature, as opposed 
to the absence of a common feature. In other words, what is required 
is a top-down approach. !e amended de"nition of Ideal !eory with 
reference to Utopia is an example of this top-down method for identifying 
Ideal !eories. De"ning Ideal !eory as a system of principles that, when 
fully-complied to by all members of society, results in a Utopia of social 
justice, would preclude the need for the problematic sub-categories of Ideal 
!eory described by Stemplowska. !e image of the top-down approach 
thus captures the Rawlsian idea that some Ideal !eory is required primary 
to non-Ideal theorising. Moreover, the addition of Utopia to the de"nition 
of Ideal !eory also serves as a necessary condition of Ideal !eory, as any 
non-Ideal !eory cannot result in Utopia.
 Although Stemplowska’s proposal faces problems that are likely insur-
mountable, she succeeds in highlighting a poignant di#erence between 
Ideal and non-Ideal theory in general. Unfortunately, the resulting attempt 
to distinguish between Ideal and non-Ideal !eory based on this di#erence 
is highly problematic and therefore not useful as a tool for di#erentia-
tion. Besides lacking the theoretical virtue of being narrow, the problems 
a#ecting Stemplowska’s proposal suggest that an approach singling out a 
common positive feature of Ideal !eory is preferable.
Charles W. Mills: “Ideal !eory” as Ideology
Having examined an article that accepts the need for Ideal !eory, it is 
important to discuss another that rejects it. !is will show us if the new 
understanding of Ideal !eory can survive established criticisms. Charles 
W. Mills proves himself to be a vocal opponent of Ideal !eory in his 
“Ideal !eory” as Ideology. His article is nothing short of an all-out attack 
on Ideal !eorizing. He sets out not only to discredit Ideal !eory, but 
to prove that non-Ideal !eory is superior in every way; going so far as to 
say that even the act of engaging in Ideal theorizing perpetuates the non-
ideal (Mills, 2005: 182). Mills proposes that only Non-Ideal theorizing 
can o#er solutions to the non-ideal. To serve his ends, Mills employs issues 
such as gender and race inequalities to demonstrate the need for non-Ideal 
!eory. !roughout his article, Mills o#ers possible de"nitions of Ideal 
!eory and argues why these do not hold. I wish to show that on two 
occasions Mills mistakenly dismisses Ideal !eories.
 Mills begins by distinguishing di#erent types of theorizing of which 
the most important, in this context, are ideal-as-idealized and ideal-as-
descriptive. !e former referring to an idealized model of what some ideal 
P should be like, the latter being a somewhat idealized or abstracted model 
of how P actually works. Mills then builds on these to de"ne Ideal !eory, 
he writes: ‘What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization 
to the exclusion, or at least the marginalization, of the actual’ (Mills, 2005: 
168). !is is of course not a strict de"nition of Ideal !eory for it is dif-
"cult to determine the extent of reliance on idealization, let alone the 
marginalization of the actual or even what the actual may be. However, 
Mills does go on to specify Ideal !eory further: ‘ideal theory either tacitly 
represents the actual as a simple deviation from the ideal, not worth theo-
rizing in its own right, or claims that starting from the ideal is at least the 
best way of realising it’ (Mills, 2005: 168). Firstly, I do not believe that any 
substantive Ideal !eory tacitly represents the actual as a simple deviation 
from the ideal. Secondly, none hold that this is not worth theorising in its 
own right. According to Mills then, Ideal !eories must then claim that 
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starting from the ideal is the best way of realizing the ideal, a claim which 
he believes to be false.
 Mills defends this claim by quoting John Rawls: ‘!e reason for begin-
ning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the 
systematic grasp of these more pressing problems’ (Rawls, 1999: 8). Mills 
mistakenly equates his own claim, that in the view of Ideal theorists ‘star-
ting from the ideal is the best way of realizing it’, with Rawls’ statement. 
He compounds this mistake by later adding: ‘the argument has to be, as in 
the quote from Rawls above, that this is the best way of doing normative 
theory, better than all the other contenders’ (Mills, 2005: 171 – italics in 
original). To start, Rawls certainly does not claim that Ideal !eorizing is 
the best way to realize the ideal, only that it is a necessary component of 
this process. Additionally, he makes no claim to have discovered ‘the best 
way of doing normative theory’. What Mills points out at best is that most, 
if not all, Ideal theorists claim that Ideal !eory is a necessary step toward 
realizing the ideal; not the best nor the only.
 Amongst Mills’ many criticisms there are two in particular that illu-
minate the error in his dismissal of Ideal !eory. In a lengthy section on 
!e Vices of Ideal !eory, Mills wishes to ‘quickly clear away some of the 
ambiguities and verbal confusions that might mistakenly lead one to sup-
port ideal theory’ (Mills, 2005: 170). Of these ‘verbal confusions’ the "rst 
conception of Ideal !eory that is mistakenly dismissed by Mills is that of 
Ideal !eory being ‘just a model’ (Mills, 2005: 171). It can be defended 
that Ideal !eories are just that: theories. As has been said, Rawls was 
satis"ed with the possibility of formulating a reasonable conception of 
justice for the basic structure of society (Rawls, 1999: 7). On the other 
hand, far from this being just a theory, any reasonably successful attempt 
to model an ideal society based on a set of principles would be no small 
feat, and would be invaluable to the study of political and social theory 
in philosophy. Moreover, an Ideal !eory need not say anything about 
the non-Ideal, nor o#er any value judgements or achievable and desirable 
recommendations for that matter. It could function as ‘just a model’, pla-
cing the burden of implementation on non-Ideal !eories. Ideal !eory 
may serve only to demonstrate or test the compatibility of certain ideals 
proposed in a theory. If these professed ideals prove to be compatible, the 
Ideal !eory would be the blueprint for Utopia. 
 !e second misconception reads ‘Nor does the simple appeal to an ideal 
(say, the picture of an ideally just society) necessarily make the theory ideal 
theory, since nonideal theory can and does appeal to an ideal also’ (Mills, 
2005: 171 – italics in original). However, I would argue the exact opposite. 
Appealing to a ‘picture of an ideal society’, or Utopia, does necessarily make 
the theory Ideal !eory. !e fact that a paradoxical assumption of favour-
able conditions is made, the fact that there must be full-compliance to the 
prescribed ideals, the fact that there can be no instances of injustice and 
the fact that these conditions constitute the ideal state, or Utopia, make 
such theories Ideal !eories. !e inclusion of Utopia only serves to under-
line that these conditions are part of Ideal !eory. Moreover, the appeal of 
any non-Ideal !eory to some ideal would require some conception of that 
ideal, which in turn requires some theory of said ideal. It is at this point 
that non-Ideal !eory necessarily appeals to Ideal !eory. In other words, 
Mills was wrong to reject Ideal !eory on the basis of these arguments. 
Moreover, we can better understand why Mills fails to reject Ideal !eory 
if we refer to Ideal !eory with reference to Utopia.
 In conclusion, the addition of Utopia to the conception of Ideal !e-
ory helps save it from the Mills’ criticism by highlighting where he falsely 
dismisses Ideal !eory. Mills does not succeed in relegating Ideal !eory 
to a sub-par status in social and political philosophy. In fact, if Mills were 
to advocate some version of Ideal !eory it would be one incorporating 
Utopia, for with Utopia come the many warnings of history against blindly 
implementing ideology. He would fervently endorse the historic dimen-
sion that Utopia brings to Ideal !eory as he himself so often appeals to it.
Conclusion
In this paper I initially re-examined the Rawlsian de"nition of Ideal !eory 
and explored the relationship between Ideal !eory and Utopian !eory. 
After "nding structural similarities, I introduced the concept of Utopia 
to Ideal !eory of Justice, resulting in a new de"nition of Ideal !eory. 
A complete Ideal !eory of Justice would be: a system of principles that, 
when fully-complied to by all members of society, results in a Utopia of 
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social justice. I found support for this new de"nition by examining Zo"a 
Stemplowska’s article on Ideal !eory, which demonstrated the need for 
a positive de"nition of Ideal !eory, meaning that it must identify some 
characteristic of Ideal !eory that non-Ideal theories lack, such as a con-
ception of Utopia, as opposed to being labelled Ideal by virtue of lacking 
some feature that non-Ideal theories share. Additionally, the new concep-
tion of Ideal !eory withstands attempts by Charles W. Mills to render all 
Ideal !eory irrelevant.
 To conclude, I hope to have shown that a de"nition of Ideal !eory 
with reference to the ideal society Utopia, is not only possible, but desir-
able; for it can both clarify the debate and withstand signi"cant criticism. 
With this, we may be encouraged to look more closely at the similarities 
between Utopianism and Ideal !eory. 
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Notes
1 Elaboration on the reasons for this conviction are beyond the scope of this essay but rely 
generally on the idea that to change the world for the better requires some conception of 
what this better world would be.
2 Moreover, it is no coincidence that both More and Rawls introduce their works by citing 
these conditions.
3 An Ideal !eory of Justice envisions a Utopia free from injustice, whereas an Ideal !eory 
of Freedom, for example, would conceptualize a society whose members su#er the bare 
minimum of constraints on their actions.
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